Key takeaways
- Reported real estate fraud losses rose to $275.1 million in 2025[1], and closing-day email impersonation remains a core scheme.
- Warn every buyer and seller early and often that wiring instructions never change by email, text or phone call.
- Verify every set of instructions by calling the title or escrow company on a number you found independently, never one in the message.
- If money is sent to a fraudster, minutes matter: call the bank to request a recall, report to the FBI's IC3 and notify the title company at once.
How the scheme works
Real estate wire fraud is usually a form of business email compromise. Criminals get into an email account belonging to an agent, a title officer, an attorney or a client, or they create a lookalike address. They watch the conversation, learn the closing date and the amount, and then, just before closing, send new wiring instructions that point to an account they control. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center describes a 2025 case in which home buyers at closing received an email impersonating their attorneys[2].
Access
A phishing email or reused password gives the criminal access to a mailbox, or they register a domain one letter different from the title company's.
Watch
They read the thread quietly, sometimes for weeks, and may set up rules that forward or hide messages.
Strike
Close to closing, a message arrives with 'updated' wiring instructions, often citing an audit, a bank change or a deadline.
Move the money
Once the wire lands, it is moved on quickly, often through several accounts, which is why speed matters if it happens.
The scale of the problem
The FBI's IC3 received 12,368 real estate fraud complaints in 2025, up from 9,359 in 2024[3]. Reported losses rose from $173.6 million to $275.1 million over the same period[1]. Across all crime types, losses reported to IC3 passed $20 billion in 2025, with business email compromise the second-largest category after investment fraud[4]. And these are only the reported cases.
Source: FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), 2025[1]
Show the data
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| 2024 | 173.6 million |
| 2025 | 275.1 million |
Consumers know impersonation is common: nine in ten US adults think people often (49%) or sometimes (42%) pretend to be someone else to steal personal information[5]. Knowing it happens does not stop people from acting on a convincing email from what looks like their title company the day before closing. Process does.
Warn early, warn often
The single most effective control is a client who knows, before any money moves, that wiring instructions never change by email and that they must call to verify. Build the warning into every stage.
- At the first meeting or buyer consultation, explain wire fraud in plain language and give the client a printed or emailed warning.
- In the buyer agreement or listing paperwork, include a signed wire fraud advisory if your state association or broker provides one.
- When the contract is signed, send a short reminder with the title or escrow company's name and a phone number from its official website.
- A few days before closing, call the client and repeat the warning out loud.
- Add a one-line warning to every agent's email signature.
Script for the client: 'Before we go further, one important thing. Criminals target home buyers with fake wiring instructions. Neither I nor anyone on my team will ever send you wiring instructions, and the title company will never change them by email. Before you send any money, call the title company on the number from their official website, not a number in an email, and confirm the instructions with a person. If anything looks different or urgent, stop and call me.'
Verify every set of instructions
| Red flag | What it looks like | What to do |
|---|---|---|
| Changed instructions | 'Our bank has changed; please use the new account below.' | Stop. Call the title company on an independently found number. |
| Urgency or secrecy | 'Wire today or the closing will be cancelled. Don't call; we're in meetings.' | Treat urgency as a warning sign, not a reason to hurry. |
| Lookalike address | titleco-closings.com instead of titleco.com, or a letter swapped | Compare the full address with earlier messages and the company's website. |
| New channel | Instructions sent by text, a personal email or a messaging app | Do not act on them; confirm by phone with the title company. |
| Unusual account | An account in a person's name, a different state or an overseas bank | Escalate to the broker and title company before any wire. |
| Odd tone or errors | Different writing style, odd phrases, a new signature block | Assume compromise and verify by phone. |
Find the number yourself
Use the title or escrow company's official website, a prior verified contact in your CRM or the number on the original contract documents, never a number in the email with the instructions.
Speak to a person
Ask for the closing officer by name and confirm the account name, bank, routing number and account number read back from their system.
Confirm the amount
Confirm the exact amount and date with the closing officer.
Wire a small test, if the title company supports it
Some title companies allow a small confirmation wire before the full amount. Follow their process.
Confirm receipt
After sending, call again to confirm the funds arrived in the right account.
Protect your own email
Agents' mailboxes are a common way in, because they contain every party's name, the dates and the amounts. Secure them like a bank would.
- Turn on multi-factor authentication for email, the CRM, the transaction platform and e-signature tools.
- Use a password manager and a unique password for every account.
- Check your mailbox monthly for forwarding rules or filters you did not create, which are a common sign of compromise.
- Use the title company's secure portal for documents and instructions where it offers one, rather than email attachments.
- Do not send or forward wiring instructions yourself, even to be helpful. Point clients to the title company.
- Keep client contact details, including phone numbers, in the CRM so you can verify by phone quickly.
Seller proceeds and payoffs
Buyers are not the only targets. Criminals also try to redirect a seller's proceeds by sending the title company 'updated' payout instructions in the seller's name, or to alter mortgage payoff instructions. Ask sellers to give their proceeds instructions directly to the title company, through its secure process, and to call to confirm any change. A related risk is a criminal pretending to be the owner of a vacant property or land and trying to sell it; see seller impersonation fraud red flags and checks.
Train the team
Training works best when it is short, specific and repeated. Cover the scheme, the red flags, the verification steps and the incident plan, and include every person who touches a transaction: agents, assistants, transaction coordinators and front desk staff.
- Run a short session at onboarding and every year, with examples of real phishing emails.
- Practice the verification call and the incident steps, not just the theory.
- Make it normal to slow down. An agent who stops a closing to verify instructions should be thanked, not blamed for the delay.
- Share near-misses within the brokerage, without blame, so everyone learns the current tricks.
If money has been sent
If a client wires money and then suspects fraud, every minute counts. Have the steps written down before you need them.
- The client calls their bank's fraud department immediately and asks it to recall the wire and contact the receiving bank.
- File a complaint with the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov, with the transaction details and the fraudulent emails.
- Notify the title or escrow company and the other agent at once, so they can check their own systems and warn others.
- Contact local law enforcement as well.
- Preserve every email, text and document; do not delete anything from the compromised account.
- Notify your broker, your errors and omissions insurer and counsel, and change passwords on any account that may be compromised.
Example: the email the day before closing
Example (fictional): the afternoon before a closing, a buyer receives an email that appears to come from the closing officer, saying the title company's bank is under audit and asking her to wire funds to a different account by noon. The address has one letter changed. Because her agent warned her at the first meeting and again on the phone that week, she does not reply. She calls the title company using the number on its website. The closing officer confirms the instructions have not changed and that the email is fake.
The title company reports the lookalike domain, the agent's brokerage checks its own mailboxes for compromise and finds none, and the closing goes ahead on time. The warning took two minutes in a meeting weeks earlier. For advertising and social media habits that can expose clients to impersonation, see social media advertising rules for agents. This article is general information, not legal or security advice.
Frequently asked questions
How do I know if wiring instructions are real?
Call the title or escrow company using a phone number you found yourself, such as on its official website, and confirm the account details with the closing officer before sending money. Never use a number from the email with the instructions.
Should agents send wiring instructions to clients?
No. Agents should never send or forward wiring instructions. Clients should get them directly from the title or escrow company and verify them by phone.
What should a buyer do if they wired money to a scammer?
Call their bank's fraud department immediately to request a recall, file a complaint at ic3.gov, notify the title company and agent, and contact local police. Speed improves the chance of recovery.
How common is real estate wire fraud?
The FBI's IC3 received 12,368 real estate fraud complaints in 2025, with reported losses of $275.1 million, both up from 2024.
References
FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (2025). Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Report 2025 (opens in a new tab) β
FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (2025). Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Report 2025 (opens in a new tab) β
FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (2025). Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Report 2025 (opens in a new tab) β
FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (2025). Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Report 2025 (opens in a new tab) β
Pew Research Center (2020). Most Americans don't answer cellphone calls from unknown numbers (opens in a new tab) β